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recurance

Judith Marshall

27 Jan 2014 · Coroner William Coverdale · York

A similar concern from this report was raised again 2 times later. See the linked reports.

The coroner's concerns

  1. 1. drug errors in pharmacy records

    “The Pharmacy's Errors Book shows a number of drug errors (including higher or lower dose tablets and the wrong drugs) over a number of years. It is not clear whether and to what extent such internal records are policed.”
  2. 2. fatal dispensing error of controlled opiate

    “Despite a system of checking by a colleague it is apparent that there can be a mistake in dispensing medication which in this case was a controlled opiate drug. The consequences were fatal.”
  3. 3. lack of software to detect prescription errors

    “It is not clear whether there is any software, obtainable from the Department of Health or elsewhere, that could read prescriptions and raise an alert if the label sought to be created or if the drug sought to be dispensed is wrong in identity or amount. This would be of particular significance when a high risk drug is dispensed or when a drug is dispensed in an unusual quantity, dosage or form.”
  4. 4. human error in dosage interpretation

    “Mandatory procedures requiring a 'read-back' of the drug, its dosage, its frequency of administration and its total quantity may prevent such dispensing errors. In so far as the error in this case can be attributable to 'Human Error' it is concluded that the dispensing pharmacist focused on the figure of 60 and incorrectly attributed that to the dosage as well as to the number of capsules.”
  5. 5. lack of end-of-day verification of dispensed drugs

    “A mandatory check, by a suitably qualified pharmacist or by a third party, at the end of the day after cashing up on the till, of records of each (prescription only) drug dispensed against the prescription would be a further precaution against a repetition of these circumstances.”
  6. 6. absence of central prescription error database

    “There is evidently no central database of all prescription errors so there can be no central monitoring of such errors and no means of determining trends or particular repeat errors.”

Linked reports

Raised again laterMichael Lobban4 Oct 2019 · 5 years 8 months later
Closely relatedConfidence 0.85 · high

This report

“A mandatory check, by a suitably qualified pharmacist or by a third party, at the end of the day after cashing up on the till, of records of each (prescription only) drug dispensed against the prescription would be a further precaution against a repetition of these circumstances.”

Later report

“There appears to be no physical check of the contents of prescription boxes when carrying out the audit of schedule 2 controlled drugs.”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗
Full chain: Lack of end-of-day verification of dispensed drugs
Raised again laterJamie O'Connor21 Oct 2021 · 7 years 9 months later
Identical hazardConfidence 0.95 · high

This report

“There is evidently no central database of all prescription errors so there can be no central monitoring of such errors and no means of determining trends or particular repeat errors.”

Later report

“There is no central tracking system or central database to record what each person has been prescribed and dispensed and by whom.”
Original on judiciary.uk ↗
Full chain: Uncontrolled prescribing of contraindicated drugs

Responses

2014-0039-Response-by-Department-of-Health.pdf ↗· Department of Health and Social Care

2014-0039-Response-by-General-Pharmaceutical-Council.pdf ↗· General Pharmaceutical Council

Stated action

“We set standards for registered pharmacies which focus on the outcomes we expect to see in registered pharmacies. We inspect registered pharmacies against the standards and produce reports of our findings.”

Stated action

“The GPhC has published guidance which contains information about minimising the risk of dispensing errors”

Stated action

“There is research that shows the use of automation within a dispensing process can reduce the rate of errors. Whilst we cannot require registered pharmacies to use automation, we do ensure that the way in which we regulate does not stifle the introduction of new technology.”

Stated action

“We are considering publishing a high level summary of the case you have described to us (fully anonymised of course) in one of the next editions of our newsletter 'Regulate'”

Stated action

“The medicines regulator, the MHRA, has been working with NHS England to develop draft Patient Safety Alerts and guidance to increase adverse incident reporting via the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS), which is a central database of patient safety incident reports. We continue to work with the MHRA and NHS England to ensuring that pharmacists and pharmacy technicians use the NRLS.”

2014-0039-Response-by-NHS-England.pdf ↗· NHS England

Stated action

“Community pharmacies are required to record patient safety incidents that caused harm or have the potential to cause harm in a pharmacy errors log. They should also report these incidents to the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS).”

2014-0039-Response-by-Royal-Pharmaceutical-Society.pdf ↗· Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain

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Source: Prevention of Future Deaths reports and responses published by the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary at judiciary.uk. Crown copyright, used under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Data updated 26 Oct 2026.

A link shows that a similar concern was raised again, not why. It is not a finding about any organisation or person. Methodology and responsible use · Report an error